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Abstract 
A transaction processing facility must have a mechanism for aborting transactions on 
request. This paper describes a mechanism for aborting transactions that can be ar-
bitrarily nested and/or distributed. The mechanism consists of an "abort protocol" 
plus an adjustment to the commit protocol. The abort protocol locates and terminates 
as many of the transaction's operations as it can. If after the protocol has finished it 
is still possible that orphaned operations exist, then a simple check during the 
prepare phase of the commit protocol ensures that no orphan commits. 
The mechanism has many advantages: provided that the communication subsystem 
provides prompt failure detection. there will be no orphans: a site can abort 
unilaterally: there is little overhead on transaction-operation messages. and relatively 
few and relatively minor restrictions on the transaction facility: no information need be 
maintained in stable storage: and the abort protocol never blocks. The primary dis-
advantages of the mechanism are that the abort protocol must be synchronous. that it 
may over-abort in some cases. and that - if the communication subsystem does not 
provide prompt failure detection - there is no limit on the extent or lifetime of or-
phaned computations. 
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Measurements of some single-site database applicatiolls indicate that abolll 3% of 
all transactions abort by request [5]. Common reasons for aborting include bad user 
input and system detection of conditions such as deadlock. This paper describes a 
mechanism for the explicit abort of transactions that can be nested and/ or dis-
tributed. The mechanism consists of an "abort protocol" plus an adjustment to the 
commit protocol. The abort protocol locates and terminates as many of the 
transaction's operations as it can. If after the protocol has finished it is still possible 
that orphaned operations exist. then a simple check during the prepare phase of the 
commit protocol ensures that no orphan commits. This mechanism has been im-
plemented within the Camelot transaction processing facility [4]. 
The primary advantage of the mechanism is the low overhead it imposes on the nor-
mal processing of transaction operations: there is no need ever to place extra abort-
related infonnation in stable storage, and little extra processing needs to be done on 
inter-site messages. The main disadvantage of the mechanism is that the abort 
protocol must be run synchronously. Interestingly, these properties define an abort 
mechanism that is nearly the dual of that used by Argus [121: Section 6 discusses the 
contrast. 
The body of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the assumptions 
that underlie the work. Section 3 develops a specification of the mechanism as a 
series of refinements, while Section 4 provides informal arguments that the 
mechanism is both safe and live. Sections 5 and 6 evaluate the mechanism in ab-
solute tenns and relative to previous work, respectively. 
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2. Assumptions and Restrictions 
2.1. Execution Model 
The model of transaction execution is quite general. A single applicaLion process 
starts a transaction. invokes the operations exported by other processes called servers. 
and then initiates commitment. A transaction may consist of any number of opera-
tions that call servers at any number of sites. Servers - unlike applications -
manage segments of recoverable storage: they may also start and execute transactions 
in the course of servicing an operation. Abort can be requested by any process at any 
time up to the moment when the top-level transaction becomes prepared to commit. 
Each site has a transaction manager. which is part of the transaction facility and 
which has two primary functions. First. it maintains bookkeeping infonnation about 
which transactions are active at local selvers and which have made operation calls to 
servers at other sites. Second. it cooperates with transaction managers at other sites 
to execute the commit and abort protocols that ensure multi-site atomic behaviOr. 
Whenever a site recovers from a crash. the transaction manager aborts all trans-
actions that were active at the moment of the crash. These transactions are then im-
mediately forgotten. 
The nesting model is the following variant of the Moss model (151: 
• A transaction can spawn one or more nested transactions in parallel or in 
sequence. A parent is prohibited from accessing any of its locked data so 
long as any child is running. 
• A descendant can inherit locks held by an ancestor. 
• When a child commits. its locks - both inherited and newly acquired -
are given (anti-inherited) to the parent. 
• When a child aborts. its newly acquired locks are dropped. and its in-
herited locks are anti-inherited. 
• The effects of a committed child are made permanent only when the top-
level transaction commits. 
• Aborting a transaction implies aborting all transactions nested within it. 
• A "committed" nested transaction can be aborted. Aborting a commitled 
nested transaction implies aborting all transactions up to and including 
its lowest active ancestor. 
TI1e entire collection of nested transactions is called a Jami1U. The usual tree terminol-
ogy is used to refer to transactions within a family. This model is implemented by 
both Camelot [3. chap. 41 and Argus [Ill. 
2.2. Assumptions and Non-assumptions 
The failure model is ordinary: processes are fail-stop: sites may crash and lose their 
volatile memory: and the network can lose or duplicate messages and can partition. 
but may not manufacture or undetectably garble messages. 
No assumption is made abou t the nature of the commit protocol for nested trans-
------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
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actions: indeed. is it not even necessary that one t'_xis!. I The abort mechanism is de-
pendent upon the characteristics of the top-level commit protocol only insofar as there 
must be a "prepare" phase during which sites may vote to abort the top-level trans-
action. The topology of the protocol and the presence or absence of phases before or 
after the prepare phase are of no consequence to the abort mechanism. 
The mechanism is likewise independent of the methods for concurrency control and 
recovery.2 Keeping the abort mechanism free of any assumption about the recovery al-
gorithm creates a subUe but severe restriction: nested transactions must be undone 
from the bottom up. and any particular nested transaction can be undone only once. 
That is. the minimum assumption one can make about the capabilities of the recovery 
process is that it is able to undo transactions in reverse order of creation. 
2.3. Required Restrictions 
Besides the recovery restriction mentioned above (which is really the consequence of 
a non-assumption). five additional restrictions must be imposed upon the transaction 
facility. 
First. commitment must be synchronous: a transaction may not commit unUl all of 
its operations have been completed or aborted and all its child transactions have been 
committed or aborted. Additionally. applications and servers must abort the trans-
action enclosing any operation call that fails to respond. These restrictions simply en-
sure well-defined transactions. 
Second. there must be a site (the commit source) which is responsible for even-
tually initiating the commit protocol. It is assumed that there will be no attempt to 
commit the top-level transaction if the commit source crashes. The commit source is 
typically the creation site of the top-level transaction and the site running the applica-
tion. 
Third. the transaction identifier (110) must encode the address of the creation site(s) 
of both family and transaction. This is easily accomplished with the classic technique 
of producing unique identifiers by concatenating the host-id and a monotonic integer. 
TIOs need not encode nesting infonnation. implying they need not be variable-length. 
Fourth. a server must eventually abort any transaction that has been active for too 
long. It is easy to lift this restriction. as discussed in Section 3.7. but doing so re-
quires support from the communication subsystem that for now we do not assume ex-
ICamelot and Argus both use "lazy ('ommitment." in which the commitment or a nested transaction 
consists or no more than having its lo('al transaction manager make note or the ract in volatile memory. 
Locks are later anti-inherited only ir they are requested by a transaction in the same ramily. 
2Although this paper is written as ir the recovery method is logging and the concurrency control 
method is locking. these conventions are adopted only in order to be precise in discussing the actions 
required at various times. 
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ists. 
Fifth. the inter-Site communication subsystem must support transaction manage-
ment by performing two services beyond simple message transport: crash detection 
and piggybacked information accumulation. Performing crash detection means 
guaranteeing the abort of an operation that is directed to a site that had earlier per-
formed an operation for the same family but then crashed and recovered. Performing 
piggybacked information accumulation means intercepting outgoing operation mes-
sages. adding transaction management information to them. then having the destina-
tion intercept the (incoming) message. strip off the extra information. and merge it 
with information received on previous messages. Information accumulation 1s used as 
a mechanism to implement crash detection. These services are discussed next. 
2.4. Communication Subsystem 
2.4.1. Crash Detection 
Crash detection is important in controlling orphans. which in tum is a key goal of 
any abort mechanism. If a server crashes. all transactions active at that server must 
abort. A transaction system must guard against this sequence of events: 
1. Transaction T does operations at several servers. including some at a 
server at site S. 
2. Site S crashes and recovers quickly. As part of recovery. T is aborted at 
that site. Other sites do not learn of the abort. No memory of T is 
retained at site S. 
3. A second operation of T is directed to a second server at site S. rees-
tablishing transaction T at the site. 
4. Transaction T commits at all sites. including S. 
The transaction should abort because of the crash. but instead is partially committed 
and aborted. violating atomicity. There must be some way of always detecting the 
server crash of step 2. so that step 3 is prevented. 
If inter-site communication is done via reliable connections over which "keepa!ive" 
messages regularly travel. then crash detection is provided free by a lower layer and 
the technique discussed here is unnecessary. This section presupposes that inter-site 
communication is via datagrams. and that the transaction (acility is responsible for 
crash detection. We assume that a transaction manager can detect the death of local 
server processes and will reliably initiate abort in that case. If so. then the problem of 
detecting server crashes becomes one of detecting site crashes. 
The method used is an adaptation of a proposal [9. pp. 40-431 which was intended 
for an environment that did not include nested transactions: assuming that calls are 
synchronous and all initiated at the commit source: 
• Each site maintains a timestamp generator. It may be a clock value. or -
if the resolution is not fine enough - a "Lamport Clock" [81 whose value 
increases with every message sent or received . 
• The timestamp of the arrival of the first request by a particular trans-
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action at a particular sile is called tlIe low water mark (LWM) lor the 
transaction at that sileo 
• Piggybacked onto every response message is the LWM of every site used 
in servicing the request. 
• The creation site of the transaction is the repository for the LWMs of all 
sites involved in the transaction; this is feasible because all unaborted 
calls eventually return to it. Also. no harm is done if the repository 
crashes and the LWMs are lost: the transaction will never try to commit. 
• The transaction manager processes every response by comparing a site's 
LWM as listed in the message with the corresponding LWM in its memory. 
If it does not have a LWM for that site. it records (in memory only) the 
LWM given by the message. If a previous LWM is recorded and it does not 
match the one in the message. then one of the two sites has crashed. and 
the transaction must be aborted. 
• A site that crashes and recovers loses all recorded LWMs. and will 
generate a new. higher LWM if a transaction returns to it. 
The basic idea is that two things are needed: someUung should be different about a 
site before and after a crash. and there must be some certain way of detecting the dif-
ference. For detecting the difference. the memory of the transaction creation site is 
the logical place: every non-aborted call returns there. and if it crashes. commitment 
will not take place. 
This method is trivially extended for accommodating nested transactions. The com-
mit source is used as the repository. Every response should contain the LWM Jor the 
Jrunily for every site used during the call. A detected crash results in abort of the 
whole family. even though strictly speaking abort need be done only up through the 
least uncommitted ancestor of each transaction that was active at time of crash. 
Abort of the particular nested transaction that established the family LWM has no ef-
fect: all that is needed is a way of denoting a difference across crashes. This approach 
to crash detection requires a timestamp mechanism at every site. adding timestamps 
to every response. storing LWMs at the commit source. and - for every response 
received at that the commit source - comparing the LWMs in the message with those 
already stored. If LWMs are also placed in request messages. then in certain cases 
LWM mismatch can take place earlier. when the request is received. 
2.4.2. Information Accumulation 
The list of sites viSited by various transactions must be accumulated for later use by 
the commit and abort protocols. The crash detection algorithm likewise depends upon 
the accumulation of LWMs. Adding information to response messages provides back-
ward accumulation: adding to requests provides forward accumulation. 
111ree kinds of information are backward-accumulated: 
1. The sites used by the LrWlsacUon during the call The abort protocol re-
quires knowing the sites visited by a particular transaction. So that the 
abort protocol can track down in-progress calls. the call destination 
must be regarded as a "used site" at the moment the request goes out. 
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2. The sites used by the tmnsaclioTt w1cL all its descendants during the call. 
The list accumulated at the commit source. minus duplicates. fomls the 
list of sites that must participate in the commitment protocol. 
3. For each site used during the call. the timestamp of the first arrival of 
any transaction in the family at that site. 
The first type of in[onnation is associated with a particular transaction. the second 
with a particular family. and the third with a particular site. Figure 2- 1 illustrates ex-
actly where and when extra information is added to messages. The list o[ sites used 
by a transaction and all its descendants during the call must be forward-accumulated: 
the orphan protection mechanism uses this list as described in the next section. 
It may be convenient to implement forward and backward accumulation in a form 
slightly different [rom the design described above. for two reasons. First. the list of 
sites used by a transaction and its descendants of course subsumes the list of sites 
used by the transaction alone. Second. implementing the design exactly requires sup-
porting a notion of "call" that transcends the notion of transaction. since a single call 
may use many transactions. Adding the notion of a "call" to an inherently connection-
less message system would be inconvenient. perhaps extremely so. Further. handling 
requests and responses differently is inconvenient. Consequently. every request and 
response message may be loaded with the same extra infonnation: 
l. The identity and timestamp of every site used by the transaction. ever. 
2. The identity and timestamp of every site used by the family. ever. 
This infomlation is a superset of that required by the design. The expense of this im-
plementation would be prohibitive only if a transaction scaled to a very large number 
of siles. 
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trans. 1033 trans. 1033 trans. 1033 
X request X reply X reply 




Figure 2-1: InfonnaUon Accumulation 
A client at Site A calls a server at sHe U. and the message is intercepted by the transaction managers at 
both sites. The fonnat of the earh message is shown below the message flow diagram. Messages I, 2. 
and 3 an' all requests. and all have the same fonnal. The first field lists the transaction (J 033). The 
second field indicates that the message IS a request for operation X. The third field is the one argument 
that operation X requires: its value is 95. The response has fields identifYing the transaction. the type of 
message. and the result. The message transmitted between the two transaction managers (message 5) 
has a fourth field listing the siles used by the family. and a fifth field listing the sites used by the 
transaction. Also. there is a timestamp indicating at what time the family first reached each site listed in 
the fourth and I1fth l1elds. 
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3. Protocol Description 
Several factors complicate the design o[ an abort mechanism for the target emiron-
ment. Aborting a single nested transaction may require aborting many others. and 
aborting these transactions should not prevent the remaining parts of the family from 
committing. Further. distributed transactions that are to be aborted may still be 
spreading to new sites and/or creating new descendants while abort is proceeding. 
Last. a site crash will result in the loss o[ the information that describes the spreading 
and nesting initiated at that site. There are two consequences of losing this in[or-
mation. 
First, an abort mechanism has limited ability to retain state. For instance. it cannot 
wait for acknowledgement from another site that particular transactions have been 
undone there. because that site may have crashed and lost its memory. Second. 
orphans may be created. An orphan is any operation. fmished or still being per-
formed. that must be aborted but which cannot be located. Orphans are created by 
crashes because the record of which sites call which others is kept in memory rather 
than stable storage. For example. if Site A invokes an operation at Site B and then 
Site A crashes. then the work done at B is orphaned. It does not matter whether the 
operation replies before the crash. Co-existing with orphaned transactions there may 
be committed nested transactions in the same family that should be allowed to com-
mit. The orphaned and non-orphaned operations must be distinguished by the time 
the top-level transaction commits. (A system without nested transactions can afford 
to be slower in eliminating orphans because they do not threaten atOmiCity.) 
ConsequenUy. the abort mechanism consists of two portions: 
1. An "abort protocol" which is a method for locating and undoing as many 
operations as possible. 
2. An "orphan protection mechanism" [or ensuring that orphans that es-
cape the abort protocol (due to failures) never commit up to the top level. 
I[ the abort protocol cannot undo all operations. it is responsible for recognizing this 
fact and ensuring that the orphan protection mechanism has enough information to 
do its job. 
3.1. Overview 
When abort is requested. kill messages are sent among transaction managers from 
site to site in a pattenl mimicking the pattern o[ earlier transaction-operation mes-
sages. Upon receipt o[ a kilL a transaction manager undoes the local effects of the 
named transactions and then sends a kill to all sites the dead transactions communi-
cated with. After each o[ those sites responds with a kill-ack message. the transaction 
manager returns a kill-ack to the site that sent it a kill 
If some site fails to return a kill-ack after a reasonable period o[ time. then it is clas-
Sified as dangerous; the identity of every dangerous site is synchronously reported to 
the commit source with a danger message. which is then acknowledged by a 
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danger-ack. If any dangerous site is found. then when lhe protocol lenninales. the 
aborting tree of transactions will be only parlially undone. The list of dangerous siles 
is the link between the abort protocol and the orphan protection mechanism. 
A dangerous site is dangerous for two reasons. First. if it is crashed. then there 
may exist (unknown to any other site) operations that spread from the crashed site be-
fore it went down. These operations are orphans. Second. if the site is unreachable 
due to communication failure. then orphaned work will be left there. possibly together 
with committed nested transactions that should commit up to the top level. 
The fact that is the key to the design of the abort mechanism is that every orphaned 
operation will either be active at a dangerous sileo or will have passed through a dan-
gerous site on its way to the site where it is active. The orphan protection mechanism 
is built into the prepare phase of the commitment protocol. All dangerous sites known 
to the commit source are included in the prepare message. 3 Subordinates process 
such a "dangerous prepare" message somewhat differently from a typical prepare mes-
sage. A subordinate first compares the given set of dangerous sites to its list of ac-
cumulated siles (for the entire family). If any dangerous site is in the list. the sub-
ordinate votes not to commit the top-level transaction. This policy prevents orphans 
from committing: every operation that passed through a dangerous site and which is 
now active at a site that might commit is detected and causes top-level abort. Any 
past communication with a dangerous site is conservatively assumed to be orphaned 
work. This rule overestimates the amount of orphaned work (any operation that used 
any dangerous site). and over-aborts (the whole family). 
The key to the correctness of this method is infOrming the commit source when a 
dangerous site is detected. The restriction that a family cannot be committed unlil all 
of its children are either committed or aborted is used to ensure that orphans do not 
commit: the synchronous abort call does not return until the possibility of orphan 
problems is recorded at the commit source. thereby delaying the commitment of the 
enclosing transaction. If the commit source is unreachable then the top-level trans-
action is aborted locally. If the commit source crashes. then commitment of the top-
level transaction will never be aUempted. and orphans are eliminated when each serv-
er aborts the transaction for running too long. Thus. the protocol continues to operate 
in spite of any number of failures. but "operating" may consist of aborting the top-level 
transaction if the abort of a nested transaction becomes blocked. The act of aborting a 
top-level transaction never blocks. as explained in Section 3.6. 
Thus. the apprOximate steps involved in aborting an arbitrary nested transaction 
are: 
:ll3eyond this exception. there is no further presumption that the messages of the protocol carry any 
infonnation that would simplify the abort mechanism: commit messages are assumed to carry only the 
idenliller of the committing family and to mean no more than "commit all the operations of family X:' 
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• Discover which transactions are victims (Le .. which transactions must be 
aborted). 
• Proceed from site to site undoing victims. 
• If a dangerous site is encountered. record it at the commit source. 
• If recording danger fails. abort the whole family. 
• Return to the caller once every site has either reported that its victims 
have been undone or has been recorded as dangerous. 
The protocol described so far is oversimplified and lacks several crucial details. 
Refinements in Sections 3.2 through 3.6 fill in the missing features. 
3.2. Defining Victims 
The death of transaction X implies the death of all its descendants. Furthermore. if 
X is already committed. then abort must take place up to and including its lowest ac-
tive ancestor (the abort root). Figure 3-1 gives an example of how a request to abort 








Figure 3-1: Victim Selection 
Aborting transaction C results In the death of its descendant E as well. Since C is committed. B and its 
descendant 0 must also be aborted. 
Locating all victims requires tracking down operations along two dimensions: follow-
ing nesting relations. either up (to find the lowest active ancestor) or down (to find des-
cendants). and following site-to-site spreading of each of these transactions. The pat-
tern of nesting forms a nesting tree. The pattern of spreading forms several (ar-
bitrary) per-transaction graphs with edges threaded through a common set of nodes: 
the nodes represent Sites. and the (directed) edges represent the pattern of inter-site 
calls. For simplicity. we refer to the whole collection loosely as the spreading graph. 
Figure 3-2 otTers an example of how an execution defines a nesting tree and a spread-
ing graph. 
Each transaction manager maintains its site-specific porlion(s) of the nesting tree. a 







Figure 3-2: Example Nesting Tree and Spreading Graph 
Suppose that Transaction A begins at Site I, then spreads to Site 2. At Site 2, nested transaction B is 
created and spreads to Site 3. At Site 3, nested transaction C is created and spreads to Site 1. The 
nesting tree is shown on the left, and the spreading graph on the right. 
accumulated list of sites used previously by active operations, To locate all victims, 
the nesting tree and the spreading graph must be completely traversed. For following 
both types of edge there is a convenient starting point. In the case of nesting. it is the 
abort root. In the case of the spreading graph. it is the creation site of the abort root. 
or abort source. 4 
3.3. Locating and Undoing Victims 
If the abort initiator is not also the abort source. then a series of died messages are 
sent starting at the abort initiator and ending at the abort source. The purpose is to 
proceed from ancestor to ancestor up the nesting tree to find the lowest active trans-
action. which then becomes the abort root. Accordingly. a died message idenUHes the 
most highly nested transaction that the sending site knows must abort and knows 
was created at the destination site. In general. it may happen that several transaction 
managers receive an "X died" message. trace the local child-parent relations up from 
descendant X to ancestor Y. then send a "Y died" message to another site. Figure 3-3 
illustrates this: the abort initiator sends a died message to an intermediate site which 
then sends another one to the abort source. 
Once the abort root is located. the transaction manager at the abort source begins 
to undo the victims. It should traverse (from the top down) the portion of the nesting 
tree rooted by the abort root. and for each transaction do the following: 
-1wo other significant tenns will be used in the rest of the discussion: 
• Abort target: the transa('tion named in the request to abort. 
• Abort initiator: the site (or sites) where the request to abort is made. 
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Site 1 
A: created here. migrated to Site 2, active. 
Site 2 
A: created at Site 1, active, has child B. 
B: created here, migrated to Site 3. 
committed, child of A. 
Site 3 
B: created at Site 2, active, has child C. 
C: created here, committed, child of B. 
Figure 3-3: Died Messages 
Each box represents the knowledge of the transaction manager at earh of three sites. An operation has 
been perfonned. starting with Transaction A at Site I. Sites 2 and 3 were called and they each created a 
nested transaction whirh committed. Transaction [3 is listed as rommitted at Site 2 and active at Site 3 
because of the lazy commitment of nested transactions. 
In this example. if a process at Site 3 aborts Transaction C. "[3 has died" would be sent from Site 3 to Site 
2. and "A has died" would be sent from Site 2 to Site I. Site 1 would become the abort source. and 
Transaction A the abort root. 
1. Check whether the transaction (and its ancestors) is already in the 
process of being aborted. If so. do not traverse that portion of the tree. 
2. Freeze the victim along both dimensions: prevent it from spreading. and 
prevent it from creating child transactions. 
3. Prevent any server previously uninvolved with the victim from perform-
ing operations for it. and suspend the servers involved with the victim. 
A suspended server will accept no further operations for that trans-
action, and will await instructions from the recovery process about how 
to reset the portions of its data segment that have been changed by the 
"ictim. 
Once the bottom of the nesting tree is reached. the traversal must return from the bot-
tom up. performing the following actions on the way: 
4. Tell the recovery process to undo the victim. Once this is finished. place 
an abort indicator into the log, and tell the server to drop the victim's 
locks. 
5. Send a kiU to every site that the victim spread to. 
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Other sites will initiate the same procedure when they receive a kill. The aborL in-
itiator can undo the abort target before receiving a kill [or it. However. to preserve the 
only-once recovery restriction, its transaction manager must remember to do the 
check outlined in step 1. and not perform a second undo of the subtree rooted at the 
abort target when second when a kill arrives for any of those transactions. 
Providing that certain conditions are met. eventually all operations of all victims are 
located and undone: a kill is sent along every path taken by any operation request. 
The conditions are: 
• No failure occurs. 
• No message is lost. 
• A transaction that has already been aborted at a site is prevented from In-
itiating new operations at that site. This condition both preserves the 
only-once recovery restriction and prevents a transaction from creating 
an infinite-size abort problem by perpetually looping through the same 
set of sites. 
• There must be an assumption that a transaction will not continue 
spreading operations to an infinity of new sites, or (if it does) that the 
abort protocol is. on net. "faster" than the operations and will eventually 
catch up to and abort all of them. 
Coming sections will explain how to remove the need for the first two conditions. and 
how to ensure the third. Ensuring the fourth condition would seem to require an a 
priori limit (e.g.. time or the number of sites used) on a transaction. However. the 
transaction model provides for unfettered execution. so the most that can be said is 
that the unending spread of a transaction to new sites is exceedingly unlikely. 
Besides these conditions. there are several olher sloppy aspects to the protocol as it 
stands now: 
1. It does not say when the abort call should return to the caller. 
2. Lost messages cause problems. In particular. the loss of a died message 
would prevent abort from ever occurring. Also. a lost kill would result in 
needless top-level aborts. 
3. Conversely. there are many reasons that a site may receive multiple kills 
for the same transaction: 
a. A transaction may spread to a particular site more than once. 
and from different sites. All those sites will send kill messages. 
b. Cycles may exist in the spreading graph: a transaction or one of 
its descendants may loop back to a site it has previously visited. 
c. Use of the simplified implementation of information accumula-
tion explained in Section 2.4.2 would create yet another source 
of duplication of kill messages. For example. if while servicing an 
operation. a transaction spreads from Site A to Site B and from B 
to C before returning. then Site B will be aware of C while Site A 
will know of both Band C. During abort Site A will send kill to 
both Band C. not just B. 
d. The method of traversing the nesting tree leads to further mes-
sage inefTiciencies. For example. if N transactions created at one 
site had each called a second site. then N kill messages would be 
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sent from the first site to the second, even if the lransaclions 
had a common ancestor. 
The first three causes of duplicates are illustrated by Figure 3-4, 
Remedies for each of these shortCOmings are presented in the following section. 
(sites used = S, C, 0) 
(sites used = C, 0) 
(sites used = S) 
(sites used = none) 
Figure 3-4: Duplicate Kill Messages 
If a transaction spreads, in order. from Site A to Site C. from A to B. from l3 to C. from B to D, and from C 
to B. then during abort Site C will receive kill messages from both A and B (cause al. Site B will receive 
kill messages from both A and C (cause b). and Site D will receive kill messages from both A and B (cause 
C). 
3.4. Further Refinements 
3.4.1. Returning to the Caller 
The process that (synchronously) calls for abort cannot be resumed until it is cer-
tain that every dangerous site has been recorded at the commit source. even if the 
dangerous site was in a portion of the spreading graph that will not be reached by kill 
messages sent from the initiator. Only when the abort source receives its kill-ack can 
it - and it alone - know that the entire spreading graph has been tested for dan-
gerous sites by being sent kill messages. Therefore. a kill-complete message is added 
to the protocol. The abort initiator should not respond to U1e abort call until it has 
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received this message from the abort source. This message is senl by tile abort source 
only once it has received all its kill-acks: its meaning is that the abort source certifies 
either that all operations have been undone or else that all dangerous sites have been 
recorded. If no kill-complete arrives after a time. the abort initiator should abort the 
entire family. Of course. if the abort initiator and the abort source happen to be the 
same sileo then died and kill-complete messages need not be sent. 
The precise meaning of the abort call returning can now be stated as: the abort tar-
get and its descendants have been undone at the local site. the abort source. and pos-
Sibly at other sites; dangerous sites. if any. have been recorded at the commit source. 
3.4.2. Increasing Message Reliability 
Because unacknowledged kills cause the reporting of dangerous sites. and because 
the false reporting of a dangerous site will cause top-level abort. it is reasonable to 
retransmit kill messages a small number of times. A site should not acknowledge un-
til all sites to which it sent kills have acknowledged or after it has limed out and 
recorded them as dangerous. There are three legal responses to site X sending a kill 
message to site Y: 
l. Y responds with a kill-ack that indicates that the victims are all undone. 
2. Y responds with a kill-ack that indicates that the transaction is un-
known to it. 
3. Y fails to respond. 
In either of the last two cases. X should treat Y as dangerous. but then itself send a 
"victims all undone" kill-ack. A "transaction unknown" kill-ack indicates that the site 
has crashed and later recovered with no memory o[ the transaction. 
There is no need to concoct an explicit acknowledgement for died. The fact that the 
abort source received a died is implicitly acknowledged when the abort source receives 
a kilL I[ no kill is received after a reasonable number of died retransmissions. the 
sending site should abort the entire family. This rule implies that top-level abort will 
be the result o[ a network partition that separates any of the sites along the path that 
died messages take from the abort initiator to the abort source. 
3.4.3. Pruning Extra Kill Messages 
I[ TIOs [ail to encode nesting information. then comparing TIOs will yield no clue 
about how the different transactions are related to one another. This lack of 
knowledge is a source of extra kill messages. Consider several transactions all related 
as ancestor and descendant. all active at Site X. and all created at a site other than 
X. I[ each spreads from Site X to Site Y. then during abort Site X will send one kill for 
each transaction simply because Xs transaction manager has no way to know that the 
transactions are related. The first kill will cause victims to be undone. and the cor-
responding kill-ack will indicate this. Kill-acks sent in response to later kill messages 
should likewise indicate that the victims are undone. But. because of the restriction 
that a transaction may be undone only once. these "late" kills must not cause a 
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second undo. 
Thus a site must remember aborted transactions long enough to be able to properly 
handle late kill messages. The simplest way to remember aborted nested transactions 
for an adequately long period of time is to not forget them until top-level commit or 
abort. at which time the enUre family is forgotten. 
Although wasteful of network bandwidth. the duplication of kills increases the 
chance that the abort will spread to all sites. This is a property not to be discounted. 
since distributed abort is often triggered by a failure. Any technique for improving the 
effiCiency of nesting-tree traversal must be designed carefully. since straightforward 
correctness arguments are constructed around the fact that the abort protocol 
traverses the path of every inter-site operation. 
To alleviate the problem that - in general - a transaction manager cannot know 
the intra-familial relationship between any two transactions active at its site. the com-
plete nesting history of a transaction can be piggybacked on the first call to new site. 
Now every transaction manager is ensured of knowing the relations among trans-
actions active at its site. Using this information. extra kills can be pruned out of the 
traversal of the nesting tree. The protocol is changed so that if some site has already 
sent a kill to another site on behalf of one transaction. then kill is not resent to the 
same site by any more lowly nested transaction. The pruning is massive: a site sends 
a kill to any oU1er site only once. 
The TID argument of the kill message is reinterpreted to mean: undo all trans-
actions at or below this level. With this change. another action (in addition to freezing) 
must be taken while performing the local downward traversal of the nesting subtree 
rooted by the kill argument. The traversal procedure should develop a list of <site. 
transaction> associations. one for each site that any of the transactions had spread to. 
The transaction associated with a site is the most highly nested one that had spread 
to it. When the traversal procedures turns around and climbs back up the tree. the 
kill sent to a site lists its associated transaction as the argument. 
Giving every site a complete picture of the nesting relations of its active transactions 
preserves the completeness of the protocol despite the pruning. Now. ilie only source 
of duplicate kills is when different sites send kills pertaining to the same subtree. 
There are two cases to consider: 
1. The first kill received is for the most highly nested transaction. If so. 
then all transactions will be undone as a result of the first kill 
2. The first kill received is not for the most highly nested transaction. In 
this case. the frrst kill will undo only a portion of the subtree. To 
preserve ilie only-once recovery restriction. the tree traversal caused by 
later kills should stop at the point(s) where an earlier kill started. 
In either case. later kills will be handled properly. thanks to the "already aborted" 
check performed during local downward traversal. 
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With Lhe pruning optimization, the purpose of the died rnessa,~e is limiled to olllv 
determining which transactions are active: it is no longer useful in determining th~ 
intra-family connections among nested transactions. 
3.5. Abort Protocol as Exception Mechanism 
Experience has shown [16. pp. 123-126] [1. p. 288] that it is desirable for the abort 
protocol to be a distributed exception mechanism. This is easily done by having the 
abort initiator supply a "reason for aborting" with its request to abort. This infor-
mation is then propagated to every site in died and kill messages. If the aborting 
process is different from that which created the transaction. then the creator should 
be sent a notification message giving the cause of the abort. When such a message is 
received. control is transferred to the end of the transaction. Since kills disseminate 
from abort root. if there are several simultaneous aborts then the reason [or aborting 
is determined by which died message is the llrst to reach the abort source. 
3.6. Aborting Top-Level Transactions 
If a failure prevents a died (danger) message from being delivered to the abort (com-
mit) source. nested abort risks blocking until the failure can be repaired. To prevent 
blocking. the nested abort becomes a top-level abort: therefore. the liveness of the 
abort mechanism depends on always being able to perform non-blocking abort of the 
entire family. Fortunately. because of the crash detection property of the communica-
tion subsystem. this is easily done. 
To abort a top-level transaction. the initiator first undones the family locally: it then 
sends a died message directly to the family's creation site. (This site is guaranteed to 
be the abort source.) The initiator next sends kill messages to all sites that it knows 
the family spread to. then forgets about the family. It is permissible to forget im-
mediately even if any combination of died and kill messages are lost. Once the abort 
iniliator has forgotten the family. the site is indistinguishable from one that has 
crashed and recovered. Accordingly. the crash detection mechanism will prevent 
another operation from executing and committing at the site. Thus. once any site has 
aborted a top-level transaction. it will not commit. A simple case analysis presented in 
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 demonstrates that - no matter which type of message is next sent 
- a crashed or recovered site will always be detected. and orphans will never commit. 
Aborting top-level transactions is much simpler for two reasons. First. because of 
the crash detection mechanism. orphaned work cannot commit: the abort initiator is 
sure to vote no to any request to commit. Second. the abort root is trivially identified. 
so there is no need to send died messages. The kill-complete message is eliminated as 
well. and the utility of a kill-ack is limited to increasing the reliability of kill delivery. 
Note that the crash detection mechanism must employ a timestamp LWM rather 
than a simple crash count (as used in [111l because "crash detection" is needed to 
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NEXT MESSAGE RESULT 
Operation request Sender Urnes out and aborts. 
If crashed sHe is commit source. all other sites must 
eventually time out and abort orphans: otherwise. 
Operation response sender Urnes out and aborts. 
Sender fails to receive kill-ack. times out and reports 
Kill crashed site as dangerous. 
If crashed site is commit source. there will be no top-
level commit: otheIWise. site that sent kill times out 
Kill-ack and reports this site as dangerous. 
Because abort call doesn't return. enclosing trans-
action doesn't commit. Site that sent operation re-
Kill-complete quest times out and aborts. 
Sender fails to receive kill. times out and aborts top-
Died level. 
Site is commit source: there will be no top-level com-
Danger mil. 
Site is not commit source and has not yet sent its 
kill-ack: site that sent kill to it times out and reports 
Danger-ack it as dangerous. 
Table 3-1: Sending to Crashed Site 
The next message Is either an operation request or response. one of the messages of (some) commit 
protocol. or one of the messages of the abort protocol. Specification of the commit protocol is beyond our 
scope. The table shows the result in the other cases. 
detect a site that did not crash bu t rather performed a top-level abort and forgot. 5 
3.7. Preventing Orphans Entirely 
If the communicauon subsystem provides the right sort of crash detection via 
keepalive messages6 then the abort mechanism will prevent orphans entirely. 
If a site's communication subsystem "pings" all other sites that have communicated 
with it (i.e .. sent a message to it or received a message from it). then when some site 
crash or network partition occurs. all sites that have sent or received messages across 
the failed component will be prompUy informed of the failure. Each site will then in-
itiate the abort of all transactions that communicated across the failure. Thus a site 
crash does not result in losing the knowledge of which sites the transaction has 
spread to beyond the crashed one. The abort protocol "continues" on the "other side" 
of the failure instead of being blocked. 
5Just as with a crash COllnt. production of locally-generated timestamps requires an occasional write to 
stable storage to ensure monotonicity. The alternative Is a real-time timestamp which could be obtained 
from something like an N11l [141 time server. 
"This requires that the interval between sllccessive keepalives must be shorter than the time in which 
a site can recover. Currently. typical siles take minutes to recover. 
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NEXT MESSAGE ACTION RESULT 
If caller is still up. its 
If crash detection check is crash detection detects in-
made on requests as well consistency and initiates 
as responses. operation abort. If caller is down. 
will be rejected. Other- operation becomes (pos-
wise. operation wil be per- sibly isola ted) orphan: will 
fonned and crash will be abort via local server 
detected (and abort in- Umeou t or via AP. Same if 
itiated) when response is caller crashed and 
Operation request received. recovered. 
Response rejected by Abort initiated because of 
Operation response crash detection crash detection. 
Send "transaction un- Sender will report this site 
Kill known" kill-ack. as dangerous. 
Site that sent kill to this 
one times out and reports 
Kill-ack Ignore. this one as dangerous. 
Because abort call doesn't 
return. enclosing trans-
action doesn't commit. 
Site that sent operation 
request times out and 
Kill-complete Ignore. aborts. 
Sender will time out and 
Died Ignore. abort top-level. 
Site is commit source: 
there will be no top-level 
Danger Ignore. commit. 
Site is not commit source 
and has not yet sent its 
kill-ack: site that sent kill 
to it times out and reports 
Danger-ack Ignore. it as dangerous. 
Table 3-2: Sending to Recovered Site 
One advantage of coupling low-level failure detection with an "eager" abort protocol 
is that a much stronger guarantee can be made about orphan elimination: there will 
be no orphans - the abort protocol will locate and undo all operations. Another 
major advantage is that there is no longer a need to require servers to abort long-
running transactions: the transaction is guaranteed to abort if abort is requested or if 
there is a failure. and these are exactly the circumstances under which it should 
abort. So there is no need to bound transaction lifetime. Of course. servers may con-
tinue to do so as part of their resource control policy. but it no longer need be required 
by the abort mechanism. The disadvantage of aborting when a lower layer reports a 
failure is that a partition - even a transient one - causes abort. 
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4. Informal Correctness Arguments 
This section offers informal arguments thal the abort mechanism is bOlh safe and 
live. In the context of an abort mechanism. safety means that no orphaned operation 
ever cOmmits. and liveness means that all aborted operations do eventually abort. 
4.1. Safety 
The skeleton of the safeness argument is: 
1. The crash detection algorithm guarantees lhat the top-level transaction 
cannot commit if any site crashed or aborted the lop-level transaction. 
2. Because of the crash detection guarantee. top-level abort is safe. It is 
guaranteed that if the top-level transaction aborts anywhere at any time. 
then it will commit nowhere. 
3. Use of a dangerous site is a necessary-but -not-suiTicient condition for an 
operation to be an orphan. 
4. Therefore. if the top-level transaction aborts whenever danger is 
detected. no orphan will commit. 
These statements are elaborated below. 
Crash detection. Simple arguments show that once a transaction's LWM is forgotten 
at a site. then if the transaction returns there. that fact will always be revealed by 
LWM mismatch. The reason is that when a forgotten transaction retun1S to a site. its 
LWM will initially be missing there and then will be set to a value higher than any 
previously recorded LWM for that transaction at that site. If LWMs are recorded only 
in response messages and LWM matching occurs only at the commit source. then a 
"crash" will always be detected at the commit source when the LWM arriving on a 
message is greater than that recorded earlier. If LWMs are recorded in both requests 
and responses. then mismatch will be discovered at the site that crashed if the sender 
had previously communicated with that site. Table 4- I enumerates what happens in 
each case of this scenario. 
MESSAGE PREY COMM? WHERE DETECT HOW DETECT 
dest=missing. 
Request Yes destination msg=Prev 
cs=Prev. 
Request No commit source msg=higher 
dest=missing. 
Response Yes destination msg=Prev 
cs=Prev. 
Response No commit source msg=higher 
Table 4-1: Crash Delection 
There are four cases: whether the message is a request or response. and whether the sender and destina-
tion have previously communicated. For each of these cases. the table Indicates where the LWM mis-
match will occur and what two values the LWMs will have. "Prev" denotes whatever LWM value was 
recorded at another site because of the first operation that executed at the destination before it forgot its 
LWM. 
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Top-level abort is saJe. As part of "forgetting" about a family. its LWM \\;11 be ex-
punged, So, from the point of view of the next message pertaining to that family that 
arrives at that site. the site is the same as one that had crashed and recovered or one 
where the family had never been active. As shown above. any attempt to reestablish 
any transaction within the family at the aborted site will be detected and lead to abort. 
Aborting in case oj danger overestimates orphans. By definition of the abort 
protocol. every orphaned operation will either be active at a dangerous site. or will 
have passed through a dangerous site on its way to the site where it is active. An or-
phaned operation is one that it is unreachable by the abort protocol. Since the 
protocol duplicates the pattern of operation calls. an unreachable operation is one that 
followed an inter-site path that the protocol cannot follow. 
4.2. Liveness 
The basic abort mechanism is live only in a degenerate sense. That is. if failures 
produce orphans. the only guarantee about their elimination is that eventually all or-
phans will be aborted by server timeout. So the abort protocol is simply a perfor-
mance optimization to orphan elimination by timeout. 
If the abort mechanism can depend upon failure reports from the communication 
subsystem as discussed in Section 3.7. then the abort mechanism is live because the 
abort protocol does - in the absence of failures - succeed in locating all operations of 
aborting transactions. Liveness in the absence of failures translates to overall liveness 
because. when a site crashes. the communication subsystem will report a failure to 
every site that had communicated with the failed site. This is what would happen 
were the site to remain up and send kill messages. 
It is easy to see that. provided there are no failures. the abort protocol without the 
opUmi7.ation of Section 3.4.3 will locate all operations. A kill message is sent along the 
path taken by any operation request. If the kill is lost. then retransmission will 
succeed in delivering it. If retransmission fails. then a failure has occurred. 
It is also true that. provided there are no failures. the optimized abort protocol will 
locate all operations. Although the optlmi7..ation reduces the number of kiUs sent. it 
remains the case that a site sends one kill to every other site to which any of its trans-
actions spread. The kill argument is the transaction most highly nested at the send-
ing site that also spread to the destination site. Therefore. at every destination site it 
is the case that some site will send it a kill which has its most highly nested trans-
action as the argument. 
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5. Evaluation 
Beyond the obvious goal of correcLness. there are many properties that an abort 
mechanism should have: 
1. Low overhead: do not add to the overhead of normal processing only to 
facilitate aborting. SpeCifically. 
a. Do not add log writes. 
b. Do not add messages to the commit protocol. 
c. Add as little extra information as possible to messages or log 
records. 
2. Efficiency: perform abort as efficienUy as possible. 
a. Traverse the nesting tree and spreading graph as effiCiently as 
possible. 
b. Do not unnecessarily abort enclosing transactions. 
3. Speed: since the abort protocol is a performance optimization. it should 
be fast. 
a. Drop locks as fast as possible. 
b. Resume the process that invoked abort as soon as possible. 
c. Do not delay the commitment of an enclosing transaction beyond 
the return of the abort call of the nested transaction. 
4. Special cases oj liveness: there are several things tha t should be done 
faster than "eventually." 
a. Allow unilateral abort. which means that unless a transaction 
is prepared. a site may abort the transaction without having first 
to communicate with any other site. 
b. Extenninate orphans as quickly as possible. 7 
c. Continue operating in spite of failures. (Abort is often triggered 
because of failure.) 
For top-level abort. some of these goals (such as 2b and 3c) are vacuous. It seems 
highly unlikely that any abort mechanism could satisfy all these goals completely and 
simultaneously. since meeting the overhead and efficiency goals denies the 
mechanism the information it would need to accomplish other goals such as 2b and 
4b. which require preCise and timely identification of orphans. 
The abort mechanism described in this paper completely satisfies all the goals ex-
cept these. which are mosUy. but not completely. satisfied: 
1. Overhead: 
c. Extra information is added to messages. but its size is propor-
tional to the number of sites involved in the transaction. not to 
the (possibly much larger) number of transactions in the family. 
2. Efficiency: 
a. In general. more than the optimal number of messages (kills and 
kill-acks) are sent while traversing the nesting tree and spreading 
graph. 
7The Argus orphan elimination algorithm provides a stronger and more quantified guarantee: an or-
phan .... ;11 be eliminated before it ('an read items whose values were read earlier by another transaction 
and passed to it as arguments 112. 61. 
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b. The polley of aborting; the top-level transaction if any active 
operation used a dangerous site aborts more than just o~phaned 
operations. 
3. Speect 
b. The abort call is synchronous; that is. the caller does not regain 
control until the protocol has finished. 
4. Liveness guarantees: 
b. The only guarantee made about orphans is that they will never 
commit. 
The following sections discuss - and to some extent justifY - the reasons underlying 
the failure to meet these goals. 
5.1. Overhead 
An abort mechanism must be able to distinguish between orphaned and non-
orphaned operations by the time the top-level transaction attempts to commit. To do 
so in a model that places no limits on transaction lifetime. nesting. or distribution. ei-
ther extra messages must be sent or else information must be added to at least some 
existing messages in order that sites that are aware of the existence of orphans can 
inform the other sites. Appendix I contains a detailed statement of what information 
must be maintained by a transaction manager. 
A presumption of this work is that a transactional computation is more likely to 
consist of a very large number of transactions than a very large number of sites. 
Hence. the abort mechanism was designed so that the amount of information pig-
gybacked on messages was not proportional to the number of transactions within the 
family. The simplified implementation of information accumulation described in Sec-
tion 2.4.2 violates this principle. and so should be used with care. 
5.2. Efficiency 
Efficiency ojlree/graph traversal Despite the pruning optimization of Section 3.4.3. 
the abort protocol stU! sends more than the optimal number of kill messages. These 
extra messages arise because of the speed goal. which dictates a paraUel traversal of 
the tree/graph. An optimal message count could be obtained by traversing the nest-
ing tree in a more orderly fashion: e.g .. by breadth-first search. 
Using a message-optimal protocol would likely not be a wise tradeoff of speed versus 
efficiency. At the present time. the wasted network bandwidth is not likely to be a 
severe problem. since distributed transactions typically do not involve many sites. and 
since aborts are rare. It is conceivable that experience will show that distributed 
operation increases the percentage of aborted transactions; for example. nested trans-
actions may enclose RPCs to read replicated data from several sites. with the slower 
calls being aborted once the required number of calls return. If the percentage of dis-
tributed transactions that abort is not negligible. then the resource consumption of 
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the abort protocol should be reexamined. 
Extent oj unnecessary aborts. If the sites used by different nested transactions are 
disjoint. then the top-level transaction can commit even if some nested transactions 
failed to abort completely. Ensuring this property was an explicit design objective. be-
cause of the pleasant consequence when nested transactions are used to enclose 
single-site RPCs: the failed abort of an RPC will not prevent the enclosing transaction 
from committing. An example is: 
1. Site A (which Is the commit source. for simplicity) makes calls within 
nested transactions to replicated data at sites B. C. and D. 
2. Sites Band C respond. and since 2 out of 3 sites satisfies the read 
quorum condition of the data replication method. the nested transaction 
enclosing the call to Site 0 is aborted. 
3. Coincident with the abort. Site 0 crashes. so kill messages sent from A 
to 0 are not acknowledged. 
In this case. Site 0 will be recorded as a dangerous site. When commitment happens. 
a "dangerous prepare" is sent from A to Band C. Since neither has any record of com-
municating with D. both vote yes, and the transaction commits. This sort of situation 
may be common if the use of replicated data is popular. and if remote procedure calls 
are wrapped within nested transactions to facilitate failure isolation. Argus does this, 
as does Avalon [2). 
Retention oj data structures. Although aborted families are forgotten immediately. 
aborted nested transactions are not. The overhead of retaining the descriptors of 
aborted nested transactions is small. since there are likely to be many more com-
mitted nested transactions (which must be remembered anyway) than aborted ones. 
5.3. Speed 
The performance of an abort protocol is variable since it depends upon the depth of 
nesting. the extent of spreading. and the amount of work to undo at each site. 
Roughly speaking. the latency of an abort in which no failures occur is proportional to 
the diameter of the spreading graph. Kill messages spread outward until the site far-
thest from the abort source has received one. The latency of returning to the 
synchronous abort call is the cost of this kill phase plus the variable cost of sending 
died messages to locate the abort source plus sending a kill-complel.e back to the in-
itiator. 
Because abort is assumed to be rare. to an extent its perfonnance is not one of the 
important parameters of a transaction facility. It is far more important that the abort 
mechanism intrude as little as possible on the typical behavior of the system (Le., 
failure-free commitment). In this sense. the abort mechanism succeeds: all processing 
related to aborting a particular transaction happens only after the abort call has been 
invoked. 
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5.4. Special Liveness Guarantees 
Unilateral abort. Unilateral abort is a somewhat abstruse but traditional goal (lOJ. 
Its motivation is that a command to abort a transaction may represent an "emergency" 
at the aborting site. and that any unnecessary delays in undoing the transaction at 
that site are intolerable. 
Orphan elimination. The abort mechanism offers orphan protection more so than or-
phan elimination. Orphans at sites which are involved in the commit protocol do not 
survive beyond the commit protocol. Orphans at isolated sites live unlil their servers 
decide to abort them for having lived too long. Therefore. there is no elegant 
guarantee of when orphans disappear except that. because of one of the assumptions. 
they eventually do. 
If the communication subsystem provides crash detection via keepalive messages 
then a much stronger statement can be made: there will be no orphans: the abort 
protocol will locate and undo all operations. The reason is that the sites on the "other 
side" of the failure will detect the failure and themselves initiate (additional) aborts. 
For this reason. it is a major advantage for an abort mechanism to include an abort 
protocol. 
5.5. Effect of Restrictions 
The only-once recovery restriction is an artificial one. imposed to make the work 
more general. Each of the other four restrictions of Section 2.3 is essential. 
1. As explained. the correctness of the mechanism depends upon the 
synchronicity restriction: all dangerous sites must be recorded before 
the enclosing commit can be allowed to proceed. Thus. the abort call 
must be synchronous. 
2. Dangerous sites must be stored (in memory) somewhere such that. if the 
infonnation were lost. there would be no attempt to commit the top-level 
transaction. This is the definition of the commit source and reason that 
such a site is required to exist. 
3. The need for any site to be able to locate either the commit source (in 
order to report danger) or the abort source (in case of top-level abort) 
fonns the requirement that the address of both of these sites appear in 
the TID. 
4. The requirement that servers abort long-running transactions appears 
to be fundamental to the transaction model. The Argus abort 
mechanism discussed below seems to suggest that the alternative is to 
retain and systematically communicate an unbounded amount of infor-
mation so that any orphan. no matter how old. will eventually be 
detected. The optimized versions of the Argus mechanism bound the 
amount of information that must be maintained and added to messages. 
but they depend on limiting orphan lifetime in order to do so. 
Of these restrictions. the abort-on-timeout is the most bolhersome. Fortunately. it 
can be removed provided that the communication subsystem reliably detects failures. 
a feature that is common. The remaining restrictions are not very constraining. and 
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so the abort mechanism should be applicable to a wide varieLy of domains. 
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6. Related Work 
Every transaction facility must have some way of aborting transactions. so one 
would except a well-developed body of literature on the problem. However. implemen-
tations of powerful nesting models are rare. Because of this and because the only 
aspect of aborting non-nested. non-distributed transactions is the recovery algorithm. 
builders of transaction systems have rarely written about abort. There is only one set 
of documents that consider in detail how to perform abort within a Moss-based nest-
ing model: namely. those written by the Argus group [11. 17. 12.61 and derivative 
works that explore the same idea [13. 71. Since Argus is a programming language. the 
goal of its abort mechanism is to provide a bound on orphan lifetime that would be 
useful as a basis for defining language semantics. 
The Argus abort mechanism differs from the one discussed here in that there is no 
abort protocol: there is only an orphan protection scheme. Argus' abort call returns 
immediately after undoing the victim only within the local "Guardian,"8 Therefore. the 
abort call systematically creates orphans. both up the nesting tree (an up-orphan is an 
ancestor of a committed nested transaction that aborts) as well as down (a 
down-orphan is simply the descendant of an aborted transaction). Site crashes -
even if detected by keepaUves - also create orphans. Since there is no abort protocol 
to spread notice of the detect.ed crash. This is a distinct disadvantage compared to 
our abort mechanism. which can take advantage of a detected site crash: all sites that 
had been in communication with the lost site will initiate the abort protocol. which en-
sures that no orphans exist. 
The major advantage of the Argus mechanism is that it guarantees that an orphan 
will be terminated "by the time it should be:" speCifically. before it can read values 
from the database that were read earlier by another (intra-family) transaction and 
passed to the orphaned operation in its arguments. This situation can arise if data 
items are replicated and the replicas must satisfy an invariant. The danger is that a 
snapshot taken at one replica may be in con11ict with a snapshot taken earlier at 
another replica if. during the interim. a third transaction is able to obtain locks at 
both replicas and make a change. If the orphan were to see the invariant violated. 
then languages primitives may fail to work correctly. 
This posSibility is avoided because the aborting Guardian disseminates notice of the 
dead transaction in all future messages (including those of the commit protocol). All 
other Guardians repeat this notice in the information they add to their outgoing mes-
sages. Any flow of messages that could cause the locks of a first transaction to be 
dropped at one replica. followed by commitment of an intervening transaction at all 
replicas. followed by a read at some replica by an orphan. will necessarily also spread 
to all replicas the identity of the orphan. Hence the orphan's attempted read can be 
RA Guardian is a combined server and transaction manager. 
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sLOpped. and the orphan terminated. Similar but simpler tilinking applies to ciiminat-
ing crash-crealed orphans. 
To detect both kinds of orphans. every Guardian maintains the following infor-
mation and transmits it with every message (including those of the commit protocol): 
• A list consisting of the roots of all subtrees ever aborted. Argus TIDs en-
code the list of all ancestors of the transaction. so whether two trans-
actions are related as ancestor and descendant can easily be deduced 
from comparing the two identifiers. The TID of the abort root identifies all 
down -orphans. 
• The list of all guardians used by a transaction and its committed descen-
dants. their age (as measured by a crash count recorded in stable storage) 
at the time they were last used. and the age of every guardian that ever 
existed. 
This information is a complete history of all aborts and crashes: it is maintained 
across crashes by recording it in every "prepare" log record. To detect down-orphans. 
whenever a new call is received all old calls are compared against the received list of 
aborted subtrees. and received calls are compared against the old list. Any match 
identifies an operation that must be tenninated. To detect up-orphans. all old calls 
are compared against the received list of guardian ages. and received calls are com-
pared against the old list. Any mismatch identifies an orphan. 
The piggybacked information required by this design is enormous. so two optimized 
designs exist. In both cases. in order to limit the amount of infomlation piggybacked 
onto messages. limits must be imposed on transaction lifetime. The first of these op-
timizations is "time-dIiven orphan elimination." an idea which is deSCribed also in 
[13. 71. To have time-dIiven orphan elimination. the execution model must limit 
transactions to finish before a quiesce time lest they be aborted by a later release time. 
Orphans are guaranteed to be eliminated by the release time and so messages must 
carry only enough extra infom1ation to detect orphans that may exist between the 
present moment and their release time. For those cases when the quiesce and release 
times are defined to be too soon. a two-phase "refresh protocol" exists to push the 
deadlines back. The second optimized version of the Argus abort orphan elimination 
algorithm also places limits on transaction lifetime. but it drastically reduces the infor-
mation added to messages. The cost is that the information needed to detect orphans 
must be kept a central repository: Guardians exchange information with the repository 
in the background. The repository must be replicated for high availability. The exist-
ence of a replicated repository does not recreate the problem it was intended to solve 
because the consistency constraint is weak. and so the repository does not require 
transactional update. 
We argue that the abort mechanism developed in this paper is superior to that of 
Argus. Argus provides very quick partial abort and then depends upon its "strong" 
but higher-overhead orphan elimination mechanism. Our method presumes that both 
aborts and orphans are rare. and so makes a tradeoff that more properly assigns the 
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cost of aborting and orphan protection to the aborting Lransactions and places less 
burden on the nonnal events: inter-site communication and commitment. Table 6-1 
summarizes and compares the overhead of our mechanism with the first optimization 
of the Argus algorithm. Furthermore. our abort mechanism can take advantage of a 
communication subsystem's failure detection feature in order to ensure the complete 
absence of orphans. Tills is a consequence of having an abort protocol that performs 
"eager" orphan elimination as opposed to the "lazy" method of elimination in willch an 
orphan is not detected until it calls a Guardian that knows it is an orphan. 
ABORT MECHANISM ARGUS 
all aborted trans-
actions with less than 
certain lifetime: site id. 
site id. timestamp for timestamp for every 
every transaction used transaction used in 
Added to req/resp in call call 
prepare msg: dan-
Added to other msg gerous sites same as above 
Placed in stable storage none same as above 
accumulate sites & accumulate aborted 
compare timestamps transactions. sites. 
Req/resp processing with those stored and timestamps 
prepare msg: compare accumulate aborted 
dangerous sites with transactions. sites. 
Other rnsg processing sites visited and timestamps 
Table 6-1: Overhead Comparison 
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7. Summary 
We have presented a method of aborting transactions that my be arbitrarily nesled 
and distributed. The mechanism possesses many desirable features: 
• The mechanism is operates within a general transaction model and a 
realistic failure model. 
• Provided that the communication subsystem provides prompt failure 
detection. there will be no orphans. 
• A site can abort unilaterally. 
• The mechanism imposes relatively few and relatively minor restrictions on 
the transaction facility. and so promises to be portable. 
• Little overhead is imposed on transaction-operation messages. 
• No infonnation need be maintained in stable storage. 
• The abort protocol never blocks. 
The primary disadvantages of the mechanism are that its abort protocol must be 
synchronous. that it may over-abort in some cases. and that - if the communication 
subsystem does not provide prompt failure detection - there is no limit on the extent 
or lifetime of orphaned computations. 
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I. Required Information 
TIle transaction manager maintains a descriptor [or every transaction: this decriplor 
must contain: 
• Transaction state (with values such as active. committed. and aborted). 
The initial state is active. The state should be changed when abort 
begins. so that any attempt to perform another abort can be detected and 
sLopped. 
• The identity of the parent transaction. if any. 
• The identity of the transaction's children. if any. 
• The site. if any. from which the transaction spread to this one. 
• A list of sites spread to. if any. This information is both forward-
accumulated on requests and backward-accumulated on responses. 
• A list of t.he local servers involved in the transaction. 
• If the transaction is top-level: a list of dangerous sites. if any. 
• The id of the process that began the transaction. 
• The id of the process that aborts the transaction. 
• The reason for aborting. 
• A count of the number of kill-ack messages awaited. 
• A count of the number of danger-ack messages awaited. 
• Its complete nesting history. This information is needed only for the op-
timization of Section 3.4.3. 
Additionally. the transaction manager must also maintain information associated with 
the family (for commitment) and a mapping of site-to-LWM (for crash detection). 
There are six messages sent during the abort protocol. They should contain the fol-
lowing in fo rma lion: 
• Died: 
1. The transaction that must die. 
2. The reason for dying. 
3. The original target transaction at the abort initiator. 
4. The identity of the site that originally initiated abort. 
The last two items are needed to that the abort root can return a 
kill-complete. 
• Kill: 
1. The root of the subtree to be aborted. 
2. The reason for dying . 
• Kill-ack: 
l. The root of the subtree that was to have been aborted. 
2. The return code. which indicates either that the abort root and 
everything below it were undone. or that the root is unknown. 
• Kill-complete: 
1. The original abort target (sent to the abort root from the abort 
source by a series of died messages). 
• Danger: 
1. The family id. 
2. A list of dangerous sites. 
• Danger-ack: 
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